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T H E HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN CANADA is a veritable quagmire of inconsistencies 
and contradictions — constitutional, legal, and moral. Complicating matters 
even further are frequent misapprehensions and misunderstandings, particularly 
among the lay public, about the nature and extent of divorce law and practice in 
Canada's past. Contrary to popular mythology, the common law provinces of 
Canada did not slavishly follow British precedents and practice during the 
colonial period. Although the common law and Anglo-Canadian legislation did 
provide some common thread to the experience of divorce, at least outside 
Quebec, it is impossible to deal sensibly with much of its history except on a 
province-by-province basis.1 Before Confederation the provinces of British 
North America had widely varying procedures on divorce, which was plainly a 
provincial matter. And despite the granting of jurisdiction over divorce to the 
Dominion in section 91 of the British North America Act, as in other legal 
matters the provinces retained a substantial say on the subject. Sections 129 and 
146 provided that all laws in force and all courts to enforce them — including 
divorce courts — in the provinces entering union would be allowed to continue.2 
* The research that made this paper possible was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada under its Strategic Grants Division, and is a part of a larger study of 
farm women, work and property in Manitoba and Prince Edward Island. 
1 No reliable or satisfactory modern study of the history of divorce in Canada exists. Until 
Professor James Snell's long-awaited study covering the period 1900-1939 appears, we are 
forced to rely upon: (a) older legal studies such as J. A. GemmiU's, The Practice of the Parliament of 
Canada upon Bills of Divorce (Toronto, 1889) or C.S. McKee's, "Annotations: Law of Divorce 
in Canada", Dalhousie Law Review, 1 (1922), pp. 17-120; (b) twentieth-century textbooks on 
divorce practice such as R.R. Evans, The Law and Practice Relating to Divorce and other 
Matrimonial Causes (Calgary, 1923) or H.L. Cartwright and E.R. Lovekin, The Law and 
Practice of Divorce in Canada (3rd ed., Toronto, 1962); and (c) a handful of modern articles, 
such as Constance Backhouse, "Pure Patriarchy: Nineteenth Century Canadian Marriage", 
McGill Law Journal, XXXI (1986), pp. 265-312, and "Shifting Patterns in Nineteenth-Century 
Canadian Custody Law", in D.H. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law: Volume 
1 (Toronto, 1981), pp. 212-48; J.G. Snell, "The White Life for Two': The Defence of Marriage 
and Sexual Morality in Canada, 1890-1914", Histoire Sociale I Social History, XVI (1983), pp. 
111-30, and "Marital Cruelty: Women and the Nova Scotia Divorce Court, 1900-1939", 
Acadiensis, XVI11, 1 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 3-31; Rebecca Veinott, "Child Custody and Divorce: 
A Nova Scotia Study, 1866-1910", in P. Girard and J. Phillips, eds., Essays in the History of 
Canadian Law: Volume 3, the Nova Scotia Experience (Toronto, 1990), pp. 273-302. 
2 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 and 31 Victoria, c. 3 (hereafter British North America 
Act). 
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New courts in other provinces, which could act in divorce cases, would subsequently 
be permitted as well. Provincial variation on the matter of divorce was a way of 
life before the federal divorce reform of 1968, and, since that legislation operated 
through provincially administered courts and did not deal with many questions 
integral to divorce proceedings still in provincial jurisdiction (such as property 
rights and family law), the role of the provinces has remained crucial — and 
distinctive. 
The history of divorce on Prince Edward Island offers an excellent illustration 
of the extent of deviation possible from almost any generalization about the 
subject in Canada, as well as helping to make the point that deviation from 
norms is one of the few possible generalizations that can be advanced.3 No one 
could claim that the Island's curious record on divorce was typical of Canada, 
but the conditions which made peculiarity possible were built into the system. 
Thus the Island had a pre-Confederation divorce court which was allowed to 
remain dormant until 1945, when it was resurrected to deal with the marital 
problems of returning servicemen. Because the court was an old colonial 
legislative court, it was unusually constituted — at least for the 1940s — and was 
eventually reformed by the province after what should have been an important 
constitutional opinion by the Island Supreme Court that appears to have gone 
virtually unnoticed. This paper represents the first attempt to reconstruct the full 
history of the Island's strange record on divorce. Such a reconstruction must 
deal not only with the Island's peculiarities, of course, but also with the constantly 
shifting circumstances that made them possible. 
Prince Edward Island made its first foray into divorce jurisdiction in 1833, 
when its Legislative Assembly heard a petition from one Peter Fisher of Indian 
River. Fisher was a mariner, whose wife of three years had left his house and 
child — while he was at sea — to "maintain an adulterous intercourse" with a 
tailor "now resident in another Province".4 The petitioner wanted a divorce, and 
in the absence of a "competent Court in the country to grant the same", prayed 
that the Assembly would grant him relief. The Assembly, obviously regarding 
the matter as one within its purview and competence, sent the petition to a 
subcommittee to deal with, "by Bill or otherwise". 
That divorce was a question that colonial legislatures could consider had 
ample precedents, despite the monopoly over the dissolution of marriages 
3 The only scholarly attempt to deal with the history of divorce on Prince Edward Island is to be 
found in the pages of Frank McKinnon's The Government of Prince Edward Island (Toronto, 
1950), pp. 262-5. This brief account is admirable as far as it goes, but not even McKinnon could 
fully communicate the labyrinth represented by divorce on the Island in a few pages, and he was 
concerned mainly with the period from 1945 to 1950. See also the brief article by W.E. Bentley, 
K.C., "Divorce Practice in Prince Edward Island", Alberta Law Quarterly, 4 (1940-42), pp. 
246-9. 
4 Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Prince Edward Island, 1833,9 February 
1833. 
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maintained by the English ecclesiastical courts of the time and the fiction 
maintained by those courts that divorce was impossible.5 The Puritan founders 
of the New England colonies in the 17th century had never acknowledged the 
authority of the ecclesiastical courts, and had established secular divorce courts 
with relatively liberal grounds in the first years of settlement.6 Divorce was 
therefore possible in secular terms in several colonies of North America before 
1750, when the Nova Scotia Council had granted an army officer serving in the 
province a divorce from his wife on the grounds of her adultery, providing for his 
remarriage but not hers. The British government disallowed this particular 
ruling, but could not stem the trend in a Nova Scotia heavily influenced by New 
England precedent. One of the first acts of the Nova Scotia Assembly, when it 
was finally called by Governor Charles Lawrence in 1758, gave the governor and 
council the right to hear "all matters relating to prohibited marriages and divorce".7 
Through its use of the royal disallowance, the British government forced a 
narrowing of initially broad grounds (including desertion for three years while 
wilfully withholding maintenance), reducing the grounds to impotence, consan-
guinity or pre-contract, adultery and cruelty.8 Nevertheless, Nova Scotia had 
gone considerably further than the English law in its definition of grounds, 
which were much broader than merely adultery. 
When New Brunswick passed a 1791 "Act for Regulating Marriage and Divorce, 
and for Preventing and Punishing Incest, Adultery, and Fornication", provincial 
leaders had no doubt about the right or necessity of such legislation "in order to 
the keeping up of a decent and regular society".9 Unlike Nova Scotia, New 
Brunswick did not accept cruelty as a ground, although frigidity was allowed. In 
any event, both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had established precedents 
and principles that Prince Edward Island could apply in response to Peter 
Fisher's petition. Although the Assembly of 1833 was a warmly partisan one, the 
divorce issue seems to have been uncontentious. Two days after Fisher's petition 
was presented to the House, the committee to which it had been referred presented a 
bill entitled "An Act for establishing a Court of Divorce, and for preventing and 
punishing Incest, Adultery and Fornication". That bill was amended several 
5 For the British background, see Reginald Haw, The State of Matrimony: an Investigation of the 
Relationship between Ecclesiastical and Civil Marriage in England (London, 1953), and Lee 
Holcombe, Wives and Property: Reform of the Married Women's Property Law in Nineteenth-
Century England (Toronto, 1983). 
6 On the American background, see Nancy F. Cott, "Divorce and the Changing Status of Women 
in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., XXXIII (1976), 
pp. 586-614. 
7 Statutes of Nova Scotia, 32 George II, c. 17. See Kimberly Smith Maynard, "Divorce in Nova 
Scotia, 1750-1890", in Girard and Phillips, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, pp. 
232-72. 
8 Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1 George III, c. 7. 
9 Statutes of New Brunswick, 31 George III, c. 3. 
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times in the House and revised further by the Council, but it was passed within 
days and sent off for royal assent. The reason the legislation had appeared so 
swiftly out of committee was, of course, because that body had turned to the 
New Brunswick statutes and reproduced them virtually intact for the Island.10 
The main features of the bill taken from the New Brunswick legislation 
included: the use of the lieutenant-governor (or the chief justice of the supreme 
court in his stead) and the Council (or five members thereof) as a divorce court; 
the power of other courts to punish "Incest, Adultery, Fornication and all Acts of 
lewdness and unlawful Cohabitation and intercourse between Man and Woman"; 
the grounds for divorce ("frigidity or impotency, adultery, and consanguinity..."); 
and finally, a clause providing "that the Wife, in such case [of a decree of divorce], 
shall not be thereby barred of her Dower, or the Husband be deprived of any 
Tenancy by the Curtsey [sic] of England, unless it shall be so expressly adjudged 
and determined in and by such Sentence of Divorce". As in New Brunswick, the 
Island's property laws had (since 1781) guaranteed to married women their 
common law right to a life interest in one-third of the real property at the death 
of their husband, with a similar provision for husbands. It would have been 
logical for those rights to cease at divorce, as indeed most of the 20th century 
textbooks on Canadian divorce law would insist that they did.11 There was, 
however, nothing automatic about the extinction of dower or curtesy through 
divorce on Prince Edward Island according to the Divorce Act of 1833. The 
major new element, introduced through amendment on the Island, was a clause 
debarring an adulterous party from remarrying during the lifetime of the former 
spouse. 
Like all Island legislation, the Divorce Act of 1833 required royal assent 
before becoming law. In his comments on the 1833 legislation, Attorney-general 
Robert Hodgson noted that the neighbouring colonies of Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick had established a similar court, adding that "the present Act is (with 
the exception of the clause prohibiting the Guilty party from marrying during 
the life of his or her Wife or husband and which is believed to be novel) a mere 
transcript of the one in force in the latter Colony, and which is considered 
beneficial".12 Hodgson's observation on the novelty of the remarriage clause was 
10 During the same period that the Island was establishing a divorce court, New Brunswick was 
revising its legislation to enable its divorce court to hear cases more expeditiously, while during 
its 1833-34 legislative session, the assembly of Upper Canada heard introduced (and dropped 
before second reading) a bill "to enable married people to obtain divorce in certain cases". 
Whether this increased activity on the divorce front was purely coincidental or a response to 
some presently unknown common stimulus is not clear. 
11 See, for example, Cartwright and Lovekin, The Law and Practice of Divorce, which states 
axiomatically (p. 146) that "Dower being an inchoate right which only crystallizes when a 
husband predeceases his wife, having been during the marriage seized of lands, the right 
automatically expires upon the granting of a decree of divorce or annulment". 
12 Colonial Office Papers [hereafter CO.] 226/50/163, Public Records Office, London. 
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not entirely accurate, since Nova Scotia had attempted to do something similar 
nearly a century earlier. But the British government behaved similarly in both 
cases, and this bill was not accepted by the Crown in the normal course of events. 
The reasons for this delay were apparently not forwarded to the Island authorities 
and need not concern us here. In any case, the 1833 bill was resubmitted in 1835 
as Prince Edward Island 5, William IV, c. 10 with both the remarriage clause and 
the clause allowing other courts to punish various sexual digressions (copied 
originally from the New Brunswick legislation) omitted. The comments of 
Attorney-general Hodgson on the amended legislation are instructive: 
The want of a Court of Divorce is felt as a grievance, and it is believed that 
this is the only Colony in North America which has not such a Court. The 
Act of the 3rd year of the reign of His Present Majesty, which the present 
Act repeals, has not yet received His Majesty's Assent, and it is surmised 
that some of the Provisions of that Act which go to preclude the guilty 
party in cases of Divorce for Adultery from again contracting Matrimony 
in the lifetime of his or her former Wife or husband and provide for the 
punishment of Incest and Adultery in the Supreme Court have been the 
chief obstacles to the passing, the present Act therefore has been passed to 
meet these Objections, consequently leaving out the Clauses contained in 
the former Act supposed to be obnoxious — in case that Act should by any 
chance be assented to in the mean time, this Act contains a Clause repealing 
it.13 
Whatever the reasons for the delay, the Crown confirmed the 1835 legislation in 
1836, and the Island finally had a divorce court. 
Having a court to deal with divorce is not quite the same thing as actually 
having divorce, and a number of sources repeat the misconception that, as 
Backhouse puts it, "not one application was brought [before the court] during 
the entire nineteenth century".14 The records of the Island court of marriage and 
divorce have certainly not survived in toto, but enough scattered evidence remains 
to indicate that the court did, at least occasionally, have applicants. Peter Fisher 
may have used the court once it was established, and two other cases can be 
documented in some detail. For the case of Collings v Collings, filed in the court 
of divorce late in 1840 and heard in 1841, a complete case file survives in the 
Public Archives of Prince Edward Island. '5 In the case of Capel v Capel, heard in 
1864, most of the papers on the divorce action do not survive, but material on 
two other cases related to that action is still available and it is possible to 
reconstruct, at least partially, the original case. 
13 CO. 226/52/294-5. 
14 Backhouse, "Nineteenth Century Canadian Marriage", p. 270. 
15 RG 2810/141-2, Public Archives of Prince Edward Island [hereafter PAPEI]. 
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By 1840 an Executive and a Legislative Council had replaced the governor's 
council of the Island, and the court of divorce — as the lieutenant-governor's 
court — went to the former rather than the latter. At this point responsible 
government had not yet been introduced on the Island, and so the Executive 
Council was not yet composed of the ministers of the government. Nevertheless, 
the question of the composition of the court was one of a number of rules of 
practice detailed in several papers included in the Collings v Collings case file, 
one labelled "Queries as to practice in Divorce Court" and another "Precedents 
in the Court of Marriage & Divorce, or Memo, of the usual proceedings in the 
Court of Marriage and Divorce with a table of fees". The presence of these 
papers suggests that the court had not met often, if at all, since its creation, and 
was laying down its rules before hearing this particular case. The proceedings 
were as follows: a libel (or claim) was filed by the plaintiff and served upon the 
defendant who was to file an answer; a commission examined witnesses for 
either side using prepared interrogatories; the complainant then petitioned for 
publication of testimony, which was read at the first meeting of the court; then 
counsel was heard, if necessary; finally the court was closed and the decision 
(either a divorce decree or a dismissal of the case) was rendered. These procedures 
were relatively non-adversarial. The schedule of fees included l is 8d per day to 
the registrar for attending court and £1 per day for the lieutenant-governor and 
each councillor attending court; a simple case was not likely to cost less than £20, 
and complex ones could be even more expensive. Given such costs, only the 
well-to-do ought to have been able to afford the process. 
The libel stated the claims of the plaintiff. Collings and his wife had been 
married in 1826; she had left his bed and board in 1838 and ever since lived 
separate from him, committing adultery and removing from the Island in the 
process. The plaintiff was unable to supply the original copy of the marriage 
licence, and the question of the documentation of the marriage became as 
important a matter to the interrogatory commission as the alleged adultery. The 
defendant (but not the person with whom the alleged adultery had been committed) 
was served with a writ at Miramichi in New Brunswick, but did not respond. The 
proceedings continued nonetheless. The commissioners determined that it was 
practice at the time of the marriage for the presiding justice-of-the-peace to 
retain the original copy of the licence, but in this case the j .p. had died and his 
papers had been destroyed. They also heard several witnesses on the subject of 
the adultery, which was, itself, a fairly complex business. 
According to two independent witnesses, the defendant had been a member of 
a party intending to sail from Charlottetown to St. Peter's Harbour on the north 
shore of the Island. When the voyage was delayed by high winds, the party was 
invited by one Edward Wood to pass the night aboard his schooner, docked at 
the Charlottetown wharf. The defendant, appearing intoxicated, went down 
into the cabin of the vessel with her fellow passengers, and more wine was drunk. 
After a time, the other passengers were ordered off the vessel, one commenting, 
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"This is strange work, I see we are not wanted here, I will go and watch them". In 
company with one of his colleagues he looked through the companionway to see 
Wood "assisting the said Ann Collings into one of the Births [sic] in the Cabin 
and immediately after the said Edward Wood got into the same Birth [sic] with 
the said Ann Collings". The witnesses then went off to various taverns in 
Charlottetown for more refreshment, returning later to observe that the two 
were still in the same berth. When the boat for St. Peter's was at last ready to 
depart the defendant was summoned, but could not be found. The boat ultimately 
proceeded without her. The principal witness testified that he could not "but 
believe that the said Edward Wood and the said Ann Collings had illicit connexion 
with each other on the night referred to". A second witness corroborated most of 
the story, also testifying that he believed "that criminal connexion must have 
taken place". Based upon this evidence, the court dissolved and annulled the 
Collings marriage "for the Crime of adultery", and went on, as was its prerogative, 
to bar the dower of the defendant. The two commissioners charged three guineas 
each for the examination of five witnesses, three of them regarding the marriage 
and its certificate, and with clerk's costs, the bill for the execution of the commission 
was £9 6s 8d, raising the total cost of the action well over £20. 
The next divorce case on the Island for which we have evidence occurred in 
1864, the year of the Charlottetown Conference. By this time, two significant 
changes had taken place that affected the Island court of marriage and divorce. 
One was the adoption of responsible government, which meant that the court 
was no longer simply a legislative court, but a political one as well, since the 
Island's Executive Council, from which most of its membership was drawn, was 
now the cabinet and composed of the party in power in the House of Assembly. 
The second was the passage of imperial statutes on divorce, particularly the 
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 (20 and 21 Victoria, c. 85) and its 
subsequent revisions (21 and 22 Victoria, c. 108; 22 and 23 Victoria, c. 61 ; and 23 
and 24 Victoria, c. 144). By 25 and 26 Victoria, c. 81, the act of 1860, which was 
due to expire on 31 July 1862, was made perpetual, and it was thus in force in 
England in 1864. This act shifted jurisdiction for divorce from ecclesiastical 
courts to a Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, and established the 
notorious double standard for cause, whereby husbands could gain divorce on 
the sole grounds of adultery, while wives would have to demonstrate that since 
the celebration of the marriage, the husband "has been guilty of incestuous 
adultery, or of bigamy with adultery, or of rape, or of sodomy or bestiality, or of 
adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her 
to a divorce a mensa et thoro, or of adultery coupled with desertion, without any 
reasonable excuse, for two years or upwards".16 The new legislation also provided 
for the court to order alimony to the wife in the divorce decrees. This legislation, 
16 This provision was repealed by the Canadian Parliament in 1925. 
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while not in force on Prince Edward Island, did suggest the direction of England's 
reform of its divorce law. 
A case file for Capel v Capel in the court of marriage and divorce does not 
survive, but there is documentation on two related cases involving the litigants. 
One was an indictment in the Supreme Court of the Island for assault upon 
Anne Capel by her husband, Henry, brought by a jury from the Court of Assize 
and General Jail Delivery for Queen's County early in 1864. The defendant was 
found guilty and sentenced to three months in the common jail of Queen's 
County as well as a recognizance of £100 to keep the peace before discharge.17 
The Court of Marriage and Divorce not only granted Anne a divorce, but 
ordered Henry (who was a surgeon residing in Bedford) to pay alimony to the 
plaintiff. He refused to pay, and was imprisoned for contempt by the court. 
Capel's lawyer applied for a writ of Habeas Corpus on the ground "that the 
Court has not the power to enforce its decree by attachment". This petition was 
rejected by a Supreme Court judge at chambers on 21 August 1865 because, 
opined the judge, "I incline to think that the 5 Wm. 4 c. 10, which constitutes the 
Governor and Council 'A Court of Judication in the matters and premises 
aforesaid with full power and jurisdiction in the same', intended to give this 
power to enforce its decree".18 
The unnamed judge went on to explain his ruling: 
It is, no doubt, true that where a Statute creates a tribunal to put in force 
laws of the mother country, which were previously dormant for want of a 
Court to administer them, the new tribunal must follow the principles and, 
as far as possible, the forms of procedure usual in Courts having cognizance 
of such matters in England. But in this country one (and indeed the most 
effective) mode of enforcing a decree used in England {viz., excommunica-
tion) cannot be employed, as we can hardly presume the Legislature 
intended to give that power to the Governor and Council. And therefore, it 
would seem reasonable to suppose that while the Legislature intended the 
new tribunal to adhere to the principles followed in administering that 
branch of law in England, it did not intend to restrict it in every particular 
to the English practice, but left it to adopt one more fitted to the circumstances 
of the country in which its functions were to be exercised. But I pronounce 
no decided opinion on this point. If it were necessary to do so, I should 
require to give a more careful examination to the authorities than I have 
done. 
17 Supreme Court Records, Case Papers 1864: Capel v Capel, RG6, PAPEL 
18 Reports of Cases determined in the Supreme Court, Court of Chancery and Court of Vice 
Admiralty of Prince Edward Island by the Honourable James Horsfield /Wers(Charlottetown, 
1872). 
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The application was discharged because "the complaint is merely that the mode 
adopted to enforce obedience to a legal decree is irregular". Presumably at this 
point Henry Capel decided to pay, since there is no further record of him in the 
court files of the Island, and no further evidence of any activity by the court of 
marriage and divorce; one later commentator insisted without documentation, 
however, that Capel had died in jail.19 In any event, a subsequent chronicler of 
the "Bench and Bar" of the Island reported that in the Capel v Capel case, "the 
court appears to have exhausted its energies".20 The suggestion is strong that no 
further cases were heard by the court before the entrance of the Island into 
Confederation in 1873. 
While it would be tempting to conclude that upon entrance into the Dominion 
the Island had sacrificed its jurisdiction over divorce to section 91 of the British 
North America Act, such was not the case. It was true that by 1901 the Island had 
achieved a certain fame (or notoriety) as the only jurisdiction in North America 
that had not experienced a divorce over the preceding thirty-odd years, but that 
record was the Island's own responsibility and was not connected to union.21 
The Island could and did blame Ottawa for many things, from lack of ferries to 
fishery policy, but not for the lack of a divorce court. An Island government had 
on at least one occasion refused to resurrect the now-dormant court of marriage 
and divorce, and only in 1913 did any Islander desire a divorce sufficiently 
strongly to employ the complex and expensive mechanism of the Canadian 
Senate's Committee on Divorce, the procedure available to Canadians without 
access to provincial courts of divorce. The refusal of the Island government to 
constitute the divorce court in the case ultimately brought to the Senate in 1913 
was perhaps understandable since it was common knowledge at the time that the 
case was collusive.22 One member of the Island government of the time later 
insisted that if the defendant in the Senate case "had applied to the Supreme 
Court of Prince Edward Island he would certainly not have obtained a divorce; 
but the Senate here was not supposed to know the circumstances, and a divorce 
was granted".23 In any event, the strength of Island feelings about divorce would 
be exhibited in 1920, when a bill was introduced into the Canadian Senate to 
establish a divorce court for the Island. 
The increasing pressure for divorce in Canada, exacerbated by the social 
upheavals of World War I, led to the introduction of several bills respecting 
19 Bentley, "Divorce Practice", p. 247. 
20 John A. Mathieson, "Bench and Bar", in D.A. MacKinnon and A.B. Warburton, Past and 
Present of Prince Edward Island (Charlottetown, 1906), p. 140. 
21 The Daily Patriot (Charlottetown), 6 March 1901, reprinting an undated article from the 
Boston Herald, reports on the absence of divorce on the Island. 
22 Statutes of Canada 3-4 George V, c. 183, "An Act for the relief of Elizabeth Adelaide 
Rayner". 
23 Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada (Ottawa, 1920), pp. 201-2. Senators always 
suspected that a fair percentage of the cases they heard were collusive in nature. 
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divorce in the Canadian Senate in 1920. One piece of general legislation was 
withdrawn and replaced with two bills, Bill J (an omnibus piece of reform 
applying to all Canada except Quebec) and Bill I (intended to give divorce 
jurisdiction to the Superior Courts of Ontario and Prince Edward Island and 
extending to those provinces the law of England as it existed on 15 July 1870, 
thus effectually transferring parliamentary jurisdiction over divorce to those 
courts and introducing English principles such as the double standard). The 
proponents of the latter legislation insisted that it was "very conservative", 
leaving "the substantive law exactly as we have it today", which was not entirely 
true for the Island, given its 1835 legislation.24 Bill I's introduction by the 
Chairman of the Senate Divorce Committee was largely a result of the increasing 
number of divorce cases from Ontario being heard in the Senate. The inclusion 
of Prince Edward Island was merely to provide symmetry, since the Island was 
the only other common law province besides Ontario that had no superior court 
with jurisdiction over divorce. Unlike Ontario, however, the Island did have a 
pre-confederation court. One senator from the Island insisted that the province 
had no need or desire for a divorce court, and another maintained that the 
province had a perfectly good divorce court and did not require special legislation. 
"We have a court in Prince Edward Island", he argued, "leave the question to us. 
We do not want the Federal Government to override our authority".25 Other 
senators agreed with this position, indicating a willingness to vote against the 
legislation because of the inclusion of the Island and adding to the strength of 
those who opposed divorce in general. 
In the course of the debate, the cost of a divorce in Ottawa — as much as 
$2,000 — for returning servicemen from a poor province was advanced by some 
as one argument in favour of a local court, while others maintained that the cost 
and difficulty of a Senate divorce was a useful deterrent.26 In the end, Island 
Senator B.C. Prowse supported the bill, insisting: 
We do not often have a divorce case in Prince Edward Island. So far as I 
can remember, we have had only one. But I do not see any reason why we 
should not have a divorce court on the Island, in case we should need it, so 
that a poor man as well as a rich man might take advantage of it.27 
To this position others had already responded by pointing out that an Island 
court already existed. Both divorce bills were passed by the Senate by large 
majorities, opposition coming chiefly from Quebec, but were left off the order 
24 Ibid., p. 166. 
25 Ibid., p.m. 
26 Ibid., pp. 176,232. 
27 Ibid., p. 233. 
96 Acadiensis 
paper in the House of Commons on a technicality in the 1920 session.28 Divorce 
was too touchy an issue to be debated in the popularly-elected and badly fragmented 
House of Commons in 1920. 
The chairman of the Senate Divorce Committee insisted in 1920 that "there is 
a great disappointment" on Prince Edward Island regarding the failure of Bill I, 
adding "I understand that there are a few cases in which soldiers are concerned, 
and it is a long way to have to come up here in the winter time, when, as everybody 
knows, the ice conditions are bad." His observations probably said more about 
the Senate awareness of Island grievances about the transportation links promised 
at Confederation than about divorce, however. While the Senate was debating 
Bill I, the Legislative Assembly of Prince Edward Island passed a resolution on 
the proposed legislation: 
... Whereas, The people of this Province have not requested the establish-
ment of a Divorce Court. And Whereas, The establishment of such a Court 
will tend to destroy the stability of the home and encourage the dissolution 
of the marriage tie. Resolved, That in the opinion of this House it is not in 
the best interests of our people that a Divorce Court should be established 
in this Province until such time as our people indicate a desire for the 
establishment of such a Court in the Province.29 
The Charlottetown Examiner editorialized of the legislative resolution a few 
days later: 
The attempt of the Senate to foist a Divorce Court upon this Province was 
properly denounced. It is stated that more than fifty per cent of the divorces 
granted in the United States are based on "trumped up charges" resulting 
from the fascination of the husband, or wife for someone else. Given 
facilities for it in the courts, the Divorce Evil will increase. So far, P E 
Island is practically free from it. We need no Divorce Court. We want 
none.30 
Neither the Legislative Assembly nor the newspaper indicated what evidence for 
popular desire would be acceptable. 
And so the Island continued in a virtual state of limbo regarding divorce. The 
Island's own Lucy Maud Montgomery made use of the absence of divorce courts 
in Ontario and Prince Edward Island in her 1927 novel Jane of Lantern Hill. The 
28 Ibid., p. 858. 
29 Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Prince Edward Island, 1920, p. 94. 
30 Charlottetown Examiner, 29 April 1920. 
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plot hinged on the marital separation of young Jane's mother and father, the 
former living in Toronto and the latter on the Island and thus unable to finalize a 
divorce. Montgomery obviously had not done much research on the subject, 
since either parent could have gone to the Senate with evidence of adultery on 
the part of the other, and the availability of provincial courts would not have 
made divorce possible in the absence of an adulterous relationship. Certainly the 
Island continued with its curious reputation on divorce, as an article in a 1929 
issue of The American Magazine entitled "Prince Edward — The Island where 
there is no Divorce and no Crime" demonstrated.31 This piece was a paean of 
praise for an idyllic Island without a divorce problem, a crime problem, an 
unemployment problem, or a poverty problem. As author William S. Dutton 
put it: 
Progressive, prosperous, and up-to-date, enjoying the newest comforts of 
modern life and familiar with its luxuries, the 88,000 folks of this Island go 
nightly to their beds untroubled and unscathed by those dark problems 
which are keeping our own police, sociologists, and preachers awake or 
tossing with bad dreams. Why? It seemed to me that we in America, with 
our rising crime and divorce rates, ought to be interested in the answer. My 
wife and I went up to Prince Edward Island to get it. 
As a piece of investigative journalism, this article may have left much to be 
desired. But the author did offer some interesting insights into both his own 
preconceptions and particularly into the official Island mentality. 
How long William S. Dutton spent on the Island doing his research is not clear 
from his article, nor can we know the names of everyone he talked with on the 
subject of divorce. He mentioned by name Frederick J. Nash, the president of the 
Patriot Publishing Company, Frank R. Heartz, the lieutenant-governor of the 
province, John A. Mathieson, the chief justice, Dr. Cyrus Macmillan, head of 
the English department at McGill University, and A.E. Dewar, "a prosperous 
retired farmer now residing in Charlottetown" and known for "his reputation 
for sound thinking and common sense". All five men were quoted at some length 
on the subject. Dutton's informants, to a man, emphasized the importance of the 
home and the church in producing a social standard in which divorce was 
unthinkable. Interestingly enough, they did not single out the Island's substantial 
Roman Catholic population as a crucial element, regarding traditional Protestantism 
as being as inimical to divorce as Catholicism. 
According to Dutton's report of his interview, publisher Nash pointed out that 
"few young men marry here until they can provide homes for their brides and 
31 William S. Dutton, "Prince Edward Island: The Island where there is no Divorce and no 
Crime", American Magazine, CVIII, 6 (December 1929), in RG 2537/64, PAPEL 
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maintain them". Mathieson opined that "Divorce is looked upon as an admission of 
failure here, ...a mark against a man's record, a thing he must explain", adding 
that "the fact that a man is divorced is a handicap to him if he seeks a responsible 
position and justly so". According to farmer Dewar, "divorce just isn't fashionable 
here. It isn't a subject for popular conversation. Folks aren't concerned about it 
like you are in the States. ...That's how you came by your divorce problem: You 
made divorce fashionable and popular through arguing about it. Up here, we 
just don't argue". The Lieutenant-Governor observed that the Island was 
empowered by the 1835 statute to establish a divorce court, "but no governor has 
ever bothered to form something for which there is no public demand". He went 
on to argue: 
I know of no place that has a higher standard of morality, and of no people 
who take a greater pride in their homes. The people derive from God-fearing 
wholesome stock. They are industrious, and the wealth is generally 
distributed and not concentrated in a few hands.... We are isolated and 
beyond the influence of any large city. The island might be likened to a big 
village in which everybody knows everybody else. 
Professor Macmillan observed that few Islanders went to the United States to 
get divorces, adding his view that "the inheritance laws of the Island don't 
recognize such divorces" and assuring the interviewer that "It doesn't happen 
often enough even to be talked about as gossip". The most powerful deterrent to 
divorce, Macmillan insisted, was "Tradition"; he stressed that "sentiment in a 
community of this size is more powerful than any law". Not surprisingly, therefore, 
the creation of a divorce court for Ontario in 1930 was an event that produced 
not a ripple on Prince Edward Island, despite the earlier legislative tandem. 
As we have seen, William Dutton's assertions that one divorce in 1913 was 
"the only divorce in the Island's recorded history of almost four hundred years" 
and that the Island's own divorce court had never met were overstatements. As 
for Dr. Macmillan's opinion that few Islanders went abroad for divorce, it was 
probably accurate enough, although the occasional foreign divorce would 
emerge in the subsequent records of the divorce court of the Island after 1945, 
and even the handful of divorced people recorded in the Canadian censuses were 
more than Canadian courts could account for.32 In a rural society in which 
property inheritance was critical, the refusal of Island courts to recognize foreign 
divorce would be — if true — a genuine deterrent, as was the cost of establishing 
a foreign domicile. While it remains impossible to probe Island popular opinion 
on the subject, there was certainly no observable demand for divorce from 
Islanders until the 1940s. Marital breakups on the Island produced separations, 
32 Divorced persons living on Prince Edward Island numbered 42 in 1921, 28 in 1931, and 41 in 
1941. 
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but not divorces. When the 1941 census counted separated persons as well as 
divorced ones, it found 380 Islanders living apart from their spouses, and, while 
the Island had, with Quebec, one of the lowest ratios in Canada of divorced and 
separated people to total population, one in every 225 Islanders was either 
divorced or separated, compared with one in 122 of all Canadians outside the 
territories. Prince Edward Island's divergence from the national average is even 
more conspicuous when only divorce is considered. One Islander out of 2,318, 
was divorced, against a national statistic of one in every 820.33 According to the 
1941 census, the proportion of separated to divorced persons on the Island was 
one of the highest in Canada (9:1, exceeded only by Quebec's 14:1 and compared 
with Ontario's 6:1 and British Columbia's 3:1).34 With the onset of World War II, 
however, the continental patterns of marital instability began to affect even the 
Island, which between 1941 and 1945 achieved a measurable divorce rate, albeit 
one of only 2.2 per 100,000 people, as Islanders began to take advantage of the 
Canadian Senate procedures and foreign courts. 
The physical separations of war helped spawn marital problems and divorce 
everywhere in the world, and the Island was no exception. By the spring of 1945, 
the Island government, led by premier Walter Jones, under pressure to act from 
the Canadian Legion, concluded there was sufficient support on the Island to 
warrant the establishment of a provincial divorce court.35 The government tried 
first to shepherd a resolution through the General Assembly calling on the 
Parliament of Canada to extend to the Island the same legislation that it had 
used in 1930 to create an Ontario divorce court (Canada 20-21 George V, c. 14).36 
That effort was defeated in committee of the whole by a vote of 14 to 10. The 
motion was defended by its mover as necessary to deal with the "unfortunate 
marriages contracted by soldiers overseas, where wives had proved unfaithful 
and where application for divorce on grounds of adultery must now be referred 
at a great expense to the Senate of Canada".37 The opposition insisted that only a 
small number of wives were unfaithful, but none of the all male participants in 
the debate noted that husbands might similarly be adulterous while living apart 
from their wives and families. Facilitating personal readjustment (including 
divorce) for returning servicemen was an undebatable issue in 1945, and all the 
speakers paid homage to their plight. The proponents of an Island divorce court 
insisted that its absence caused unhappiness, bigamy, and common law marriages, 
adding that the costs of a Senate divorce in Ottawa exceeded $1,000. As one 
33 Eighth Census of Canada, 1941 (Ottawa, 1944), II, pp. 258-9. 
34 Canada Year Book, 1945 (Ottawa, 1945), p. 102. 
35 Charlottetown Guardian, 13 April 1945. There is no Hansard for the Legislative Assembly 




speaker observed, "All the existing practice does is to set up a divorce court a 
thousand miles away for trial before a committee of Senators at Ottawa who 
know nothing about the case". The proponents of a local court emphasized that 
no changes in grounds of divorce or other practice were contemplated. The 
opponents of a court advanced the usual arguments about the loosening matrimonial 
bonds and the frequency of collusion and fabrication of evidence. One speaker 
instanced the negative provincial response to Edward VIII's marriage to a 
divorced woman as evidence of Island public opinion. Another seriously 
suggested that returned servicemen could be accommodated within the existing 
system by making a provincial grant available to cover the expenses of a journey 
to Ottawa for a Canadian decree. 
Unable to gain legislative support for Canadian action, Jones' government 
turned to the long-dormant court of marriage and divorce. On 6 September 
1945, the Executive Council ordered the Lieutenant-Governor to appoint the 
Chief Justice to preside in his stead in such a court, and on 6 December of that 
year the court held its first meeting to make rules of practice and procedure. 
Because a pre-Confederation statute, seldom used and never substantially 
amended during the colonial period, was being resurrected, the Island's Court of 
Divorce consisted of the chief justice and at least five members of the Executive 
Council, now synonymous with the cabinet. It was thus a political rather than a 
judicial court, a fact lamented by political scientist Frank MacKinnon in his 
classic study of the government of the Island.38 Moreover, Island politicians 
were not at all certain whether sections 129 and 146 of the British North America 
Act, along with other enabling documents which allowed laws in force at the 
time of the union with Canada to continue, also permitted those laws to be 
amended after Confederation by a Legislative Assembly greatly altered in 
character from the one that had passed the original statute. Both because of the 
hostility to divorce of the Legislative Assembly and because of the constitutional 
problems, 5 William IV, as given minor amendment in 1866, was allowed to 
stand as the statute establishing the new court. 
The first meeting of the court, reported in an "Extra" Royal Gazette dated 22 
December 1945, established its ground rules. It set down the relevant legislative 
enactments relating to the court (5 William IV, c. 10; 29 Victoria, c. 11; the 
Queen's proclamation of the separation of the Council dated 13 December 1838; 
the British North America Act sections 129 and 146 and related material) and 
Schedule "B" laid down the "General rules of practice and procedure for the 
Court of Divorce of Prince Edward Island". The court followed the general rules 
of the Island's Supreme Court of Judicature for civil actions, supplementing 
them with the rules of the Ontario court regarding divorce proceedings and a few 
special rules, most made necessary by the statute of 1835. The most important of 
the special rules was that the Chief Justice should make "all necessary rulings on 
38 MacKinnon, The Government of PEI, pp. 262-5. 
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questions of evidence and points of law arising", while the council could, by 
vote, "make findings of act or render a special or general verdict upon the 
evidence adduced". From the standpoint of the historian, also important was the 
rule that stated "It shall not be necessary for any formal record or minute of 
judgment or decree of the Court to state or recite the steps or procedure by which 
such judgment or decree has been reached". In its final internal rule, the court 
allowed for a "partial rebate of fees to a plaintiff who has served in His Majesty's 
armed forces", thus reinforcing the general exigency under which it had been 
ostensibly returned to life. It now merely needed to wait for applicants. The first 
application appeared early in 1946, and the court convened for business on 22 
May. 
While it is not our intention in this article to analyse in detail the cases brought 
before the Prince Edward Island Court of Divorce after 1946, a few general 
observations based on those cases may be useful. Most of the initial cases heard 
by the court involved returning servicemen, and were brought by the husbands 
as plaintiffs. By 1947, however, the bulk of the servicemen cases had been heard 
and the court began dealing chiefly with marital breakdowns not directly 
associated with the war. Female plaintiffs became increasingly common. Roman 
Catholic marriages as well as Protestant ones were dissolved. Most of the 
marriages involved and dates of separation went back well before the war, and 
for several years the court dealt mainly with a backlog of cases that had obviously 
built up because of the lack of access to a divorce court in the province. Few of 
these separations had resulted in formal agreements of separation. The early 
court case records, moreover, make quite clear that divorce on Prince Edward 
Island was hardly the prerogative of the middle or white collar or landed farmer 
classes of the province. The vast bulk of identifiable occupations of those 
appearing before the court were relatively unskilled working class ones, and in 
such cases little or no landed property was involved. Thus, although the court 
apparently did routinely bar dower for female defendants in cases where husbands 
held property, dower was barred less frequently than one might expect. Curtesy 
was barred in only one isolated instance. Despite the continual fears expressed in 
the debates over divorce on and off the Island that collusion and fabrication of 
evidence would become a way of life in court cases, there was little justification 
for such concerns. Indeed, in the majority of post-servicemen cases heard by the 
court, the co-defendants had established a long-term relationship with children 
resulting from the adultery. There is no evidence of interference with the divorce 
process by the politicians who constituted the court and were paid $10.00 per 
case for their attendance. It is impossible from the records, of course, to determine 
whether having cases heard before members of the Island's Cabinet deterred 
some Islanders — particularly prominent ones — from submitting to the 
process. 
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Despite the successful operation of the Island Court of Divorce, continual 
murmurings were heard about its legitimacy and the constitutionality of the 
reform by the provincial Assembly. Therefore, although early in 1949 the 
Legislative Assembly amended 5 William IV, c. 10 to provide a joint jurisdiction 
in divorce for the Supreme Court of the Island and a procedure for transfer of 
cases from the Court of Divorce to the Supreme Court, that statute was not 
brought into force until the Island's Supreme Court in banco under the provisions 
of section 41 of the Judicature Act had ruled on the constitutional issues. The 
question referred to the Court by the Executive Council was: "Is it within the 
legislative power and competence of the Legislative Assembly to enact Chapter 
10 of the Statutes of 1949"? The case was heard at a special sitting of the Supreme 
Court on 14 July 1950, with the province's attorney-general arguing in writing 
for the constitutional validity of the statute and Mr. H.F. MacPhee, King's 
Counsel (one of the Island's most prominent opponents of divorce) arguing the 
negative interest. Opinion was rendered by the Court on 11 December 1951.39 
In its argument, the province submitted "that the Statute in question falls 
within the purview of Section 92 (14) rather than 91 (26) [of the British North 
American Act] and consequently belongs to the matters in relation to which the 
provincial legislature may exclusively make laws", on the grounds that "'Divorce' in 
section 91(26) is merely general language, while 'the Administration of Justice in 
the Province...including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts' is precise 
and particular language and consequently operates by way of exception". Although 
competent divorce legislation by the Dominion might override the Island statute, 
"Canada has established no Divorce Courts under Section 101 of the B.N.A. 
Act, nor, indeed, could Canada do so until some Federal Divorce laws exist to be 
administered by such Courts". But, the province insisted, there was no overlapping 
jurisdiction, for the matters in section 92(14) were reserved to the provinces, and 
the Island legislature was as free to act as it was before the British North America 
Act was passed. 
In his "Factum of Counsel for Opposite Interest", Mr. McPhee acknowledged 
that both counsels had agreed that the pre-1949 divorce legislation was valid and 
not at issue. He proceeded to argue, however, that the 1949 amendment was not 
simply legislation concerning the administration of justice, because "the substantial 
effect of the amendment is to confer upon the Supreme Court of Judicature 
jurisdiction in divorce which it did not have when this Province entered Confed-
eration", and divorce was a "subject matter beyond the competency of the 
Provincial Legislature". Precedents bearing directly on the question could not 
be submitted, he insisted, since "the situation in Prince Edward Island in 
reference to its divorce law is different from that of the other provinces". In Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick, the divorce legislation had remained substantially 
as at the time of Confederation, and the provincial legislatures had not conferred 
39 (Supreme Court), file 6973 (1950), RG24, PAPEL 
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any new divorce jurisdiction on provincial courts. In British Columbia, divorce 
law was brought into Confederation, but the right of appeal (a new jurisdiction) 
could be conferred only by the Dominion parliament. In Manitoba and Ontario, 
jurisdiction had been extended by Act of Parliament. In a lengthy historical 
section, McPhee observed that in the Maritime provinces, divorce legislation 
was introduced before the first English statute creating secular courts. The 
Maritime statutes conferred jurisdiction not upon the courts, but upon Governor-
in-Council, a legislative body. After the English act and before Confederation, 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick amended their legislation to transfer jurisdiction 
from the legislature to the courts, but Prince Edward Island did not follow suit. 
Prince Edward Island may have taken its own divorce law into Confederation, 
but that law gave jurisdiction not to the Supreme Court but to "a special Court", 
representative of the law making body. In this light, the 1949 amendment altered 
altered the Island divorce law "radically, essentially, and substantially". The 
early law specifically provided that divorces "be heard by a Tribunal representa-
tive of the law making body", rather than the Supreme Court, and this provision 
was the "special distinctive and fundamental characteristic of Divorce law in this 
province as compared with that of other jurisdictions". 
Historians have typically been more attracted by ingenious historical arguments 
than lawyers, and this case provided no exception. In the unanimous opinion of 
the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island, written by Chief Justice Thane 
Campbell, Mr. McPhee's history (plus both his precedents and his insistence that 
none were really directly relevant) was virtually rejected. The British Columbia 
references appeared particularly germane, the Court admitted, because in that 
province "substantive law (as our own) was a continuation of the law prevailing 
when British Columbia joined Confederation". The Court sidestepped the 
British Columbia line of reasoning, in which appeal procedures were held to be a 
Dominion prerogative, in favour of the cogency of Manitoba decisions, concluding 
that "in the absence of Dominion legislation conferring jurisdiction and regulating 
procedure in divorce and matrimonial causes, a provincial legislature may 
confer such jurisdiction on a provincially constituted Court, and may regulate 
the procedure therein". It dismissed the arguments about Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick, pointing out that those two provinces had recently altered the 
composition of their courts by legislative amendment. The opinion took more 
seriously the contention that the Island amendment "would have the effect of 
converting divorce from a quasi-legislative remedy to a purely judical one". This 
argument it rejected on a variety of grounds, but chiefly that the 1835 court was 
specifically a Court of Judicature and that the pattern of legislative control had 
greatly altered since 1835. The "substantive law remains the same", it contended, 
"namely relief by a Court of Judicature upon specifically enacted and limited 
grounds". The Court thus unanimously answered the original question in the 
affirmative. 
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After the constitutionality of PEI 13 George VI, c. 10 was settled, those 
appearing before the Island Court of Divorce had the option of transferring 
proceedings to the Island Supreme Court. In practice, what occurred for a brief 
period was that the cases were heard by the Court of Divorce, which granted the 
decree nisi, and the case was then transferred by petition of the plaintiff (with the 
consent of the defendants) to the Supreme Court for the decree absolute. No 
reason for this practice was ever given. Seventeen cases were dealt with in this 
awkward fashion, but in April of 1952 the Legislative Assembly amended the 
1949 legislation to allow the transfer of the action upon the consent of the 
Queen's Proctor either with the consent of all parties or after notice was given to 
all parties.40 Thereafter, cases were routinely heard by the Supreme Court and 
the Divorce Court returned to the dormancy it had enjoyed between 1864 and 
1945. Although the Island continued to have some distinctive practice growing 
out of pre-Confederation statutes (such as the barring of dower and curtesy) for 
many years after 1952, it no longer had a distinctive jurisdiction for the hearing 
of divorce cases and increasingly became integrated into general Canadian 
practice. In 1967 the Parliament of Canada finally enacted a general divorce 
statute (Canada, 16 Elizabeth II, c. 24), and in 1975 the Island reformed its 
Supreme Court to create a Family Division (PEI 24 Eliz. II, c. 27). A few years 
later family law and property rights on the Island were reformed, which, among 
other revisions, abolished the common law rights to dower and curtesy and 
repealed the province's dower legislation.41 More recently, the Island has 
provided for custody jurisdiction and enforcement, accepting the Convention 
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.42 
The thorough integration of divorce jurisdiction and practice on Prince Edward 
Island in ways common to most Canadians has been a slow and evolutionary 
process. As we have seen, the Island was an exception to many generalizations 
about divorce in Canada until after World War II. That divorce on the Island 
could be so distinctive for so many years is evidence of the many complexities of 
the history of divorce in Canada. The Island's experience suggests not only one 
additional way in which it did things differently, but the national circumstances 
that made such differences possible. 
40 Statutes of Prince Edward Island, 1 Eliz. II, c. 15. 
41 Ibid., 27 Eliz. II, c. 6. 
42 Ibid., 33 Eliz. II, c. 17. 
